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Abstract 
This study aims to investigate whether and how United Kingdom (UK)-based companies have changed their 
disclosures on curbing foreign bribery in response to the UK Bribery Act 2010 and whether such disclosure 
changes substantively reflect real allegations or incidents of foreign bribery. Along with provisions embedded 
within the UK Bribery Act, international guidelines on the elimination of foreign bribery suggested by the 
Transparency International form the basis of the disclosure index used to measure the disclosures on elimination 
of foreign bribery by the Top 100 London-listed companies between 2009 and 2012. Results show a significant 
change in disclosure from before the enactment of the UK Bribery Act to after, consistent with notions of 
institutional coercive isomorphism. On in-depth examination of news media articles and corporate reports, it is 
revealed that there is a high level of decoupling with some sample companies, whilst others disclose information 
but not substantive enough to reflect real events. Such research is imperative as this is the first known study that 
provides evidence of the actions companies have taken in response to the UK Bribery Act.  
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1. Introduction 
Little is known about whether corporations operating globally adopt measures to combat 
foreign bribery, and whether and how such measures are disclosed through different avenues 
of corporate media including annual reports, corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports and 
corporate websites. Within the accounting literature, while Everett, Neu & Rahaman (2007) 
and Neu et al., (2013) acknowledge that accounting and related disclosure practices serve as 
intermediaries between theoretical anti-corruption projects and the practical manifestation of 
such projects, there is a general lack of empirical research that investigates whether such 
practices are influenced by newly enforced regulation. Moreover, corporations’ measures to 
curb foreign bribery and their accompanying disclosures are seemingly highly under 
researched in the arena of accounting. This study fills the gap in this literature.  
International governmental organisations (IGOs) such as the Organisation for Economic and 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such 
as Transparency International (TI) criticised the state of the anti-bribery laws in the United 
Kingdom (UK) for many years. This criticism contributed to the UK Bribery Act 2010 , 
which came into force on 1 July 2011 (Ministry of Justice, 2011). Regarded as the “toughest 
anti-corruption legislation in the world” (Russell, 2011 p. 1), the UK Bribery Act criminalises 
the promising or giving of a financial or other advantage to a foreign public official to 
achieve a business advantage. It also provides jurisdiction over foreign bribery acts 
committed by any corporation with operations in the UK (Ministry of Justice, 2011). The 
factor in this Act that has sparked major controversy is its provision that criminalises 
corporations’ failure to prevent bribery (Milford, 2013). If organisations can prove that they 
adopt adequate procedures and measures to prevent bribery, such as the disclosure of anti-
bribery procedures, they may use it as mitigating evidence (The UK Bribery Act (s.7.2). In 
this sense, the Act is unprecedented. In no other country has an anti-bribery law been aimed 
at organisations’ accountability and transparency in their efforts (and failures) to curb foreign 
bribery
2
. The UK Bribery Act concentrates on corporate culture. It is, therefore, interesting to 
see how organisations have (or have not) responded to the expectations of the Act.  
While transparency and accountability are the UK Bribery Act’s objectives, the ability to 
influence transparency and accountability relies on well-implemented compliance measures 
and organisational ethics programs. Bribing foreign officials to obtain an advantage in 
business decisions is a serious problem that not only threatens social, political and economic 
structures, especially those of developing nations, but also adversely affects companies 
involved in international commerce. Foreign bribery also undermines democracy and 
threatens economic progress (Venard & Hanafi, 2008; Ministry of Justice, 2011). The Word 
Bank (2013, Para. 6) estimates that foreign bribery costs US$1000 billion every year. This 
estimate includes all forms of foreign bribery between Multinational Corporations (MNCs) 
                                                            
2 See for example: (1) The United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977, (2) German anti-bribery laws 
such as the EU Anti-Bribery Law 1998 and Combating International Bribery 2002 (3) Australia’s anti-bribery 
provisions under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (4) People’s Republic of China anti-bribery provisions under 
Criminal Law (5) India’s Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 only criminalise the willful bribery of foreign 
public officials in order to gain a business advantage but do not find companies liable for their failure to prevent 
bribery. 
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and foreign public officials (World Bank, 2013, para. 11). Foreign bribery has often been 
overshadowed and generalised as merely another form of corruption (Everett et al., 2007 on 
corruption) and so there is a strong need to address foreign bribery as a standalone societal 
concern. Thus the introduction of the UK Bribery Act and stronger shareholder interest 
presents a unique research opportunity. 
The aim of this study is two-fold. First, investigate whether and how UK-based corporations 
have changed their disclosures on curbing foreign bribery in response to the UK Bribery Act 
2010. Second, whether such disclosure changes substantively reflect real allegations of 
foreign bribery. Analysis of corporate media [annual reports and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) reports] by London’s Stock Exchange top 100 companies from 2009-
2012 and in-depth examination of news media articles in relation to these companies were 
conducted to support the aim. Through an institutional theoretical lens, we found 
corporations’ disclosures on curbing foreign bribery significantly increased from 2009 to 
2012. This finding is consistent with institutional coercive isomorphism, which suggests that 
organisations will conform to the demands of regulation to attain and maintain legitimacy 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Carpenter & Feroz, 2001; Tuttle & Dillard, 2007). Based on the 
concept of decoupling, a fundamental component of institutional theory (Fiss & Zajac, 2006; 
Sandholtz, 2012), the results of this study also show that organisations’ disclosure change is 
not substantively reflective of foreign bribery allegations and incidents.  There was a 
mismatch between organisational practice (disclosures) and organisational action (foreign 
bribery incidents). Results from in-depth investigations into three company cases - Smith & 
Nephew, AstraZeneca, and Barclays observe variation in organisation’s level of disclosure 
and degree of decoupling.  
This study is imperative because the disclosure response of corporations to the UK Bribery 
Act is yet to be researched. While many studies have examined the content and implications 
of the UK Bribery Act on employees and how this Act may differ from other anti-bribery 
laws (Kirk, 2011; Donohoe, 2011; Dunst, Diamant, & Kung, 2011; Richard & Cassam, 2012; 
Yeoh, 2012a; 2012b; Lord, 2013), this study is the first study to focus on how corporations 
respond to it. There is also a need to delineate foreign bribery from the much broader subject 
of corruption because, in light of this  Act, corporations are now expected to apply a higher 
level of accountability and transparency in international transactions. 
The rest of the paper is outlined in the following manner. Section 2 provides background of 
the bribery of foreign officials and stakeholder concern as well as the requirements and 
uniqueness of the UK Bribery Act 2010. Section 3 provides an overview of institutional 
theory, focusing on coercive isomorphism and the concept of decoupling. Section 4 outlines 
the research method of this study. Section 5 describes the results in relation to the research 
questions. Section 6 provides a discussion of the results. Section 7 provides conclusion.   
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2. Bribery of foreign officials: Background 
2.1 Bribery of Foreign Officials and Stakeholder Concern 
Business activity on a global scale is at the forefront of many MNCs’ agendas (Lord, 2013). 
Often, third party representatives, agents and intermediaries in overseas jurisdictions are used 
to bribe officials to win or maintain contracts with foreign governments (Sung, 2005; 
Cleveland et al., 2009). For many years, researchers have documented the fragile and 
underdeveloped democratic institutions and market structures within developing nations. 
They have argued that such situations are welcoming for corruptive behaviour (Meny, 1996; 
Williams & Beare, 1999, Adeyeye, 2012 p.70). It is widely accepted that cross-border bribery 
is prevalent in developing nations in which local anti-bribery regulation holds little to no 
power over big MNCs (Lane, 1984; Scott et al., 2002; Sanyal, 2012).  
Today, MNCs experience a globalised, connected and intertwining network of operations that 
makes them increasingly susceptible to organised bribery. In such an environment, 
corporations are faced with the hard challenge of implementing and monitoring effective anti-
bribery measures (Baughn et al., 2010). Therefore, governments of many developed nations 
face difficulties in regulating multinational transactions, in which attempts to do so are not 
without pressure from external stakeholders, IGOs and NGOs (Lord, 2013).  
News media plays an important role in generating worldwide concern over foreign bribery 
practices by MNCs (Stapenhurst, 2000, p.3; Macdonnel & Pesic, 2006, p.110; Welford, Chan 
& Man (2007). For Stapenhurst (2000, p. 3), the media can promote good governance and 
curb bribery by serving as an impediment to bribery when corrupt foreign public officials are 
exposed and prosecuted. News of high profile people experiencing public humiliation, loss of 
prestige, social standing, and income can deter further acts of bribery and corruption 
(Macdonnel & Pesic, 2006, p.113).  
For many years, combating foreign bribery has been a main priority for NGOs such as TI and 
the IGOs such as the OECD (Wilder & Ahrens, 2001; Carr & Outhwaite, 2011). One of the 
most well-known anti-bribery initiatives is the OECD 1997 Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (hereafter OECD 
Convention) (George et al., 2000; Nadipuram, 2013). The OECD Convention’s objective is 
promoting fair international business activity by requiring all signatory countries to 
criminalise the bribery of foreign officials (OECD, 1998). TI is committed to guiding 
corporations in implementing and monitoring a robust anti-bribery program (TI, 2010). Both 
OECD and TI initiatives create awareness of the need to counter foreign bribery. These 
organisations pressure corporations to be transparent and accountable by recommending 
companies to disclose adequate anti-bribery policy information, and by providing meaningful 
procedures to help companies to conform to the relevant regulatory landscape each company 
faces (Adeyeye, 2012, p. 50;  OECD, 2009; TI, 2010;). 
 
In the context of developing nations, anti-bribery initiatives are threatened by ineffective 
bribery legislation and lack of local support (Sanyal, 2012; Shehu, 2004). In some cases, it 
may be due to the absence of an international treaty such as the OECD Convention. When it 
involves natural resources , the MNCs appear more aggressive to obtain contracts to explore 
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the developing countries’ natural resources. At the same time, the tendency of local public 
officials experiencing political crises and an unequal distribution of wealth in many 
developing countries leads to a high demand for bribery. Regulators’ attempts to promote an 
accountability and transparency policy platform usually fail because domestic laws in 
developing nations tend to focus on the demand side of bribery (Adeyeye, 2012, p.73). Often, 
countries in these situations are not concerned with prosecuting the party that makes bribe-
related offers or promises; rather the concern revolves around the punishment of the public 
officials that accept the bribes (Adeyeye, 2012, p.72). As a result, MNCs may take advantage 
of foreign public officials by facilitating bribery payments (Adeyeye, 2012, p.72). 
 
2.2 The UK Bribery Act 2010 and Bribery of Foreign Officials 
After years of scrutiny and criticism about anti-bribery laws in the UK, the UK Bribery Act 
received Royal Assent in April 2010 and came into force on 1 July 2011 (Ministry of Justice, 
2011). Previous foreign bribery legislation in the UK, such as the Public Bodies Corrupt 
Practices Act 1889 and the Prevention of Corruption Act 1916, were deemed as inappropriate 
for a contemporary and ethically responsible nation operating in the global economy 
(Ministry of Justice, 2011). Thus, as the prominence of foreign bribery increases  in society, 
so does the regulation attempting to control it (TI, 2010).  
The UK Bribery Act is “an Act to make provision about offences relating to bribery; and for 
connected purposes” (c.23 p. 1). Its objective is to be a robust mechanism for corporations’ 
transparency and accountability (Ministry of Justice, 2011). Under Sections 1 and 2 of the 
Act, two general provisions — the “active” and “passive” bribery clauses — are given. The 
former pertains to the offering, promising or giving of an advantage in order to obtain or 
retain business; whilst the latter refers to requesting, agreeing to receive or accepting of an 
advantage in order to obtain or retain business (s.1, s.2). Unlike other existing legislation such 
as the US FCPA 1977, the aim of the UK Bribery Act is forcing organisations to assess the 
adequacy of their existing anti-bribery programmes. This law contains the first distinct 
provision for organisations that fail to prevent bribery. Section 7 (1) stipulates that 
organisations subject to the Bribery Act are liable if they fail to prevent persons associated 
with them from committing bribery on their behalf; thereby requiring companies to take 
adequate measures to control bribery-related activity in their organisation (s.7.1). 
Aligned with the OECD Convention, the UK Bribery Act criminalises the bribery of a 
foreign public official. Foreign public officials are officials who hold a legislative or 
administrative position of any kind of a country outside the UK. The sole purpose of a stand-
alone section for bribery of a foreign public official is that regulators need to be able to have 
some sort of control over corporations influencing the decisions of such officials in the 
context of business opportunities (Ministry of Justice, 2011).    
To show a company bribed a foreign public official under the Bribery Act’s Section 6, 
Bribing a Foreign Official, requires (1) the company offered, promised or gave an advantage 
to the official and that (2) the advantage was one that the official was not allowed to be 
influenced by, as determined by the local law applicable to the foreign official (Ministry of 
Justice, 2011). The Act recognises that corporations may provide hospitality and promotional 
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business expenditures, as well as local community investments, for the purposes of image 
management in foreign countries. It is because of this dynamic that the Act stresses that 
intention for a financial or non-financial is required to establish bribery of a foreign official 
(Ministry of Justice, 2011).   
These requirements return the focus to corporate culture by ascertaining whether or not the 
company did everything itcould to prevent bribery. Thus the Act allows corporations to use 
the existence of adequate anti-bribery procedures as a mitigating circumstance (s.7.2; Yeoh, 
2012a). The boundaries of the Act pushes beyond residents of the UK and organisations 
incorporated in the UK. As stated in Section 12(5), any organisation that does business in the 
UK is subject to the Act, regardless of where the act occurred. In addition, organisations are 
liable even if a person associated with the company commits bribery, meaning that 
contractors, suppliers, agents, intermediaries and anyone acting on behalf of the company is 
subject to the Act (Ministry of Justice, 2011).  
It is essential to control corporations bribing foreign public officials. For years many 
researchers have argued that payments to foreign public officials threaten economic progress 
and efficient allocation of resources (Mauro, 1998; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Venard & Hanafi, 
2008; Smith, et al., 2013). Kaufmann et al. (2003) argued that bribing foreign officials 
represents corporations’ need to make additional, irregular payments to get things done, 
violating the essence of economic efficiency because such payments take time and money; 
resources that could have been invested in more profitable, less-wasteful ways.  
Kwok and Tadesse (2006) argue that developing nations have some sort of reliance on the 
presence of MNCs due to such influential effects. This dependency means that MNCs have 
wider scope in being transparent in and accountable for cross-border transactions with foreign 
officials. Corporations operating in developing nations, especially in high-risk bribery 
regions, can be the sources of either positive or negative effects, depending on the level of 
organisational knowledge, practices, and technologies that are transferred from the 
corporation to the community in which it operates (Epstein, 2007). The UK Bribery Act 
could create positive effects by controlling the ways in which international business processes  
take place.  
 
3. Theoretical framework 
This study embraces institutional theory to understand whether and how corporations change 
their disclosures on curbing foreign bribery in response to the UK Bribery Act. From an 
institutionalist perspective, corporations would do so in order to satisfy the institutional 
expectations that come from regulatory pressure and stakeholder interest. This study 
particularly embraces two concepts within institutional theory—institutional isomorphism 
and decoupling—to inform anti-bribery disclosure practices.   
DiMaggio & Powell (1983 p.189) state that isomorphism is the “constraining process that 
forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental 
conditions.” The process of institutional isomorphism leads to convergence over time and 
ultimately to homogeneity in behaviours among organisations experiencing the same 
isomorphic pressure (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Holder-Webb & Cohen, 2012). 
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Isomorphism can be distinguished as institutional or competitive (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983). While ompetitive isomorphism is the pressure towards similarity resulting from 
market competition (Venard & Hanafi, 2008), this study relies on institutional isomorphism 
because the nature of corporations’ disclosure behaviour in response to regulatory pressure is 
more consistent with the processes of institutional isomorphism than the comparison of cross-
market competition (Deegan, 2009, p. 359).  
There are three types of organizational isomorphism- normative, mimetic, and coercive 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Normative isomorphism derives from collective norms and 
beliefs to adopt particular institutional practices (Holder-Webb, & Cohen, 2012). Mimetic 
isomorphism is the result of organisations striving to mimic on the practices of other 
organisations, due to the desire to gain their legitimacy (Deegan, 2009, p. 360). Coercive 
isomorphism generates from formal or informal pressures on organisations that derive from 
regulation, mandate, or cultural expectations. Of these three types of isomorphism, coercive 
isomorphism has been given the most attention in the field of accounting because it is 
associated with regulations and  standards (Carpenter & Feroz, 2001). Tuttle & Dillard 
(2007) suggest that coercive pressure is the most relevant in understanding the notion of 
corporations conforming to institutional expectations. Since the objective of this study is to 
investigate corporations’ response to regulation, this study only focuses on coercive 
isomorphism, as this element of institutional isomorphism is consistent with the notion of 
regulation imposing pressure on corporations’ behaviour.   
Proponents of coercive isomorphism assume that organisations adopt a structure mandated by 
other organisations on which they are dependent (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Their need for 
legitimacy comes from their need to extract resources from the organisation they rely on most 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Deegan, 2009, p.358). Corporations depend on government 
institutions for a variety of reasons. For example, they might rely on governments due to 
administrative resource reasons such as the acquisition of approved licenses. Corporations 
depend on government to be efficient in administration so that they may also be efficient in 
their response to market environments. We argue that change or coercive isomorphism is 
imposed by government regulation, being the UK Bribery Act. Since the motivation to 
conform to the demands of such regulation derives from the desire of legitimacy (Tuttle & 
Dillard, 2007), the government, in the form of regulation, is a powerful constituent of 
corporations, in which coercive pressure results in an asymmetric power relationship between 
the government and corporations.  
Some studies provide strong evidence that government regulation is a powerful driver of 
changes in corporate reporting (Alciatore, Dee, & Easton, 2004; Rahaman, Lawrence & 
Roper, 2004). In terms of coercive isomorphism, it is suggested that regulatory pressure is an 
important external coercive factor that influences disclosure behaviour (Huang & Kung, 
2010; Zeng et al., 2012). Regulatory pressure such as UK bribery legislation appears to have 
isomorphic implication because institutionalisation creates with government placing external 
coercive pressure via a shift in foreign bribery regulation, creating strong pressure for UK-
based corporations to respond to conform to the transparency and accountability expectations 
of governments, NGOs and IGOs. Due to such pressures, it is proposed that changes, in the 
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form of an overall increase of disclosures on curbing foreign bribery, from before regulation 
to after regulation, will be observed in corporations subject to the UK Bribery Act. An 
increase in disclosures on curbing foreign bribery is expected because the pressure that is 
coming from governments and organisations such as OECD and TI is one that demands 
higher transparency of anti-bribery measures and better accountability of foreign bribery 
practices.  
Along with coercive isomorphism, this study embraces the concept of decoupling to 
investigate whether the change in corporate disclosures on curbing foreign bribery, coming 
from regulatory coercive pressure, is substantively reflective of real allegations of foreign 
bribery. Decoupling is when there is a mismatch between formal organisational practices 
(disclosures) and actual organisational action (real events) (Dillard et al., 2004). While 
organisations may formally make disclosures that display conformity to institutional 
expectations, organisations may also decouple such disclosures from actual organisational 
action (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Modell, 2001; Brignall & Modell 2000; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; 
George et al., 2006). It is the decoupling action from formal disclosure practices that signifies 
organisations’ efforts to acquire or retain legitimacy, while also relieving the tensions created 
by external pressures for change (Jamali, 2010).  
We expect that organisations’ disclosures on curbing foreign bribery will have increased from 
2009 to 2012, due to the UK Bribery Act imposing coercive pressure to conform to the 
expectations of regulators. Prior research argued that decoupling is less likely to arise in cases 
of coercive pressure because such pressure leaves organisations little flexibility for non-
isomorphic behaviour (Oliver, 1991; Brignall & Modell, 2000; Yazdifar, Zaman, Tsamenyi, 
& Askarany, 2008). Therefore, evidence of corporations misaligning practices from 
disclosure in the face of coercive regulatory pressure (that supposedly reduces the likelihood 
of decoupling practices) ultimately presents an opportunity to identify the limitations of the 
Act in being effectively implemented in organisations.  
Organisations are incentivised to decouple their disclosures from practice, due to the 
perceived social and legitimacy benefits that derive from appearing to have conformed to 
regulation, while also maintaining shareholder trust (George et al. 2006). There might also be 
evidence of decoupling when organisations seek  to alleviate frictions arising from a 
misalignment of the requirements of regulation and organisations’ own objectives (Jamali, 
2010; Holder-Webb & Cohen, 2012). It can be suggested, therefore, that, while regulation 
may be a mechanism  ensuring decoupling minimisation, conformity to regulation of a 
ceremonial nature compromises true and fair accountability and transparency targets on 
which regulation, such as the UK Bribery Act, was based. 
In accounting,  some attention has been directed to corporations’ decoupling of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) from real action. Rodrigues & Craig (2007) argue that, 
even if countries formally adopt IFRS, actual accounting practices may differ due to 
companies having different characteristics in different environments. This notion is consistent 
with our study. For example, MNCs subject to the UK Bribery Act and operating in cross-
border transactions, especially in developing nations, face the challenges of doing business in 
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a foreign environment, similar to how IFRS adopters face challenges relating to different 
national or regional environments.  
While institutional decoupling in existing literature is often identified in terms of absence or 
presence (Westphal & Zajac, 2001; Fiss & Zajac, 2006), this study instead follows the 
concepts derived in Sandholtz (2012). Sandholtz (2012) studied the decoupling processes 
within organisational responses to ISO 9000 certification standards, founding two different 
types of decoupling: malignant (resulting from strong organisational opposition to 
regulation); and benign (reflection of implementation of regulation). The current study adapts 
Sandholtz’s (2012) concepts (see Table 1 below) to show that that decoupling can range 
from: 
• Malignant separation: an extreme form of institutional decoupling. For example, the 
complete non-disclosure of foreign bribery related events, or 
• Symbolic adoption: inconsistent with formal requirements of regulations, yet still 
perhaps provides some strategic information. For example, ceremonial or ritualistic 
nature of disclosures or 
• Complete implementation: where organisations are found completely compliant, 
decoupling is benign. For example, substantive or full disclosure.   
 
Table 1: Three Degrees of Decoupling: strategy and nature of disclosure 
Degree of Decoupling Decoupling Strategy Nature of Disclosure 
Full decoupling Malignant separation Non-disclosure, separation 
Slight decoupling Symbolic adoption Ceremonial, ritualistic, generic, present 
but not substantial 
No decoupling Complete implementation Substantive, detailed, full Disclosure 
 
A range of decoupling levels, (Table 1) will help answer the research question in relation to 
whether corporations’ change in disclosures on curbing foreign bribery substantively reflect 
real allegations of foreign bribery.  We expect to identify the UK Bribery Act’s limitation in 
minimising decoupling. This idea is consistent with Rodrigues & Craig (2007), who argued 
that decoupling of formally proclaiming adoption of IFRS and actual accounting practices 
raises the question of the practical effects of the formal harmonisation IFRS aims for. 
 
4.  Research Method 
This study firstly analyses corporate media including annual reports and CSR reports to 
determine whether and how corporate disclosures on curbing foreign bribery have or have not 
changed over the enactment period of the UK Bribery Act. Secondly, this study considers 
news media articles attributed to foreign bribery allegations or incidents in relation to 
corporations to which the UK Bribery Act is subject to, for the purposes of comparison in 
order to determine nature of disclosures and degrees of decoupling.  
Annual reports and CSR reports produced through the sample period of 2009 to 2012 of the 
companies listed on the Top 100 London Stock Exchange at 30 June 2013 were selected for 
analysis. The time frame from 2009 to 2012 was chosen in order to identify any shifts in 
disclosure practices from before, during and after legal enforcement of the UK Bribery Act 
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2010, being July 2011. We relied on 396 annual reports from 99 companies and 364 CSR 
reports from 91 companies. Companies that were excluded from the final sample were newly 
incorporated during the sample time period
3
. Companies without CSR reports for any of the 
sample years were also excluded for the final CSR report sample
4
.  
The annual reports and CSR reports were analyzed by developing a disclosure index 
consistent with the prior research (e.g., Cho & Patten, 2007). A disclosure index is a practical 
and valid research tool, with the selection of the items based on other indices in the literature 
or international benchmarks such as the UK’s Adequate Procedures Guidance and the TI’s 
Adequate Procedures Guidance (Ministry of Justice, 2011; TI, 2011). This study uses such 
index benchmarks on good anti-bribery practice to formulate a corresponding disclosure 
index of good anti-foreign bribery practice.  
As instructed by the UK Bribery Act, the UK’s Secretary of State, Kenneth Clarke, published 
the Adequate Procedures Guidance to the UK Bribery Act 2010 (hereafter, UK APG) 
(Ministry of Justice, 2011). The UK APG assists companies in constituting what the UK 
Bribery Act refers to as “adequate procedures”. Section 7(2) of the UK Bribery Act (2010, 
c.23, p. 5) states: 
[…] it is a defence for a commercial organisations to prove that it had in place adequate 
procedures designed to prevent persons associated with the commercial organisation from 
undertaking bribery related conduct. 
In addition to the UK APG, the disclosure index for this study draws on TI’s Adequate 
Procedures Checklist After the introduction of the UK APG, TI published guidance to assist 
companies to comply with the UK Bribery Act
5
. In a March 2011 press release, only months 
before the official enforcement of the Act and the UK APG, Chandrashekhar Krishnan, 
Executive Director of TI UK, stated that: 
“The Bribery Act, as passed by the last Parliament, is one of the best anti-bribery laws in the world. 
But the Guidance will achieve exactly the opposite of what is claimed for it. Parts of it read more like a 
guide on how to evade the Act, than how to develop company procedures that will uphold it... this [UK 
APG] undermines the Act and will limit its effectiveness. There is now a significant risk that bribery 
will go unpunished.” (TI Press Release 30 March, 2011) 
It is evident that TI found the UK’s official adequate procedures guidance  inadequate. 
Consequently, TI published ‘The 2010 UK Bribery Act Adequate Procedures Checklist: 
guidance on good practices procedures for corporate anti-bribery programmes.’ (Hereafter, TI 
APC) (Wilkinson, 2010). In contrast to the descriptive principles embedded within the 
official UK APG, the TI APC provides succinct, detailed and practical recommendations on 
good anti-bribery practice in the form of a thorough checklist. The TI APC definitively 
                                                            
3 On 2 May 2013, Glencore Xstrata plc was incorporated through a merger of Glencore with Xstrata. This newly 
incorporated company was ranked on the London Stock Exchange Top 100 at the date of sample data collection 
yet excluded from the final sample because data was needed for all sample years, 2009 through to 2012. 
 
4 A total of 8 companies did not have CSR reports available on company websites. These companies were China 
Petroleum & Chemical Corp, DP World Ltd, VTB Bank, Magnit OJSC, Megafon OJSC, Marsh & Mclennan 
Cos Inc, NEXT, and RyanAir Holdings. 
5 On December 9, 2011 the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) published a financial crime guide that 
places an additional layer of regulatory obligation over some organisations. This publication, although similar to 
the official UK APG, was excluded from this study because the FSA only applies their guidance to a specific 
group of authorised companies. 
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categorises specific operational policies and procedures, whereas the UK APG observes 
considerable overlap with the TI APC. It is for this reason that we have merged these two 
guidance documents to develop a disclosure index to measure corporations’ disclosures on 
curbing foreign bribery.  This disclosure index tool consists of five categories.  
• Managerial commitment and board oversight. Hereafter ‘Managerial’; 
• Human resources and training. Hereafter ‘Human Resources’; 
• Risk assessment in relation to curbing foreign bribery. Hereafter ‘Risk Assessment’; 
• Measures to curb different nature of foreign bribery. Hereafter ‘Measures’; and 
• Monitoring, accounting and reviewing of curbing foreign bribery. Hereafter ‘Monitor’  
These five main aspects of organisational operations in regard to companies’ fight to curb 
foreign bribery were chosen in order to reflect the principles detailed in the UK Bribery Act 
as well as the key categories developed by TI. The final content analysis disclosure index 
comprised these five general categories and 63 individual disclosure items (see Appendix A 
for disclosure index). Scored against 396 annual reports and 364 CSR reports, a total of 
47,880 individual observations for content analysis of corporate media were observed.  
This study uses a dichotomous presence versus absence score, in which ‘1’ equals disclosure 
and ‘0’ equals no disclosure, to score against the content within corporations annual and CSR 
reports, using the aforementioned disclosure checklist tool. Such procedures are consistent 
with Cho & Patten (2007), who also use a disclosure index as a tool for measuring 
disclosures. Identifying relevant sentences to include in a count is arguably more subjective 
than identifying presence versus absence whilst page counting has also been argued as being 
a weak measure of disclosures due to reports being of different margins, formats and fonts 
(Hooks & Van Staden, 2011).   
This study also uses analysis of news media articles through qualitative procedures such as 
text and statement interpretation. News media plays an important role in public policy and 
receives special attention for its political, cultural, social and economic influences (Fico et al., 
2008). News media analysis is an unobtrusive means of analysing interactions that occur in 
society; and is therefore used in this study to examine allegations of foreign bribery related 
incidents. Texts were analysed and compared with corporations’ disclosures to understand 
whether and to what degree corporations’ disclosures on curbing foreign bribery were 
substantively reflective of media’s allegations of foreign bribery related incidents. 
Understanding the degree of substantial reflection indicates the level of decoupling adopted 
by the sample companies. In this study a qualitative case-based manner is used to examine 
decoupling as a response to institutional coercive pressures. This approach is consistent with 
prior research (Edelman et al., 1991; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Westphal & Zajac, 2001). 
However, unlike prior research, this study attempts to explain different levels of 
decoupling—from no decoupling, to slight decoupling, to full decoupling. Hartz & Steger 
(2010) use news media content analysis of German newspapers in order to explore the 
changing nature of organisations and their managers in relation to corporate governance, 
whilst Fiss & Hirsch (2005) also use  news media content analysis on US-based newspaper 
articles in order to analyse the public discourse on globalisation. Accordingly, we adopt the 
same method of analysis as Hartz & Steger (2010) and Fiss & Hirsch (2005). 
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Using the Dow Jones FACTIVA database, this study extracted all news media articles that 
contained the word “bribery” or “corruption” for each of the sample companies. This study 
reviewed the following leading global news media including BBC, USA Today, The 
Washington Post, The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal (USA, Europe and Asia), 
The Guardian, The Sunday Times, The Times, Financial Times, The International Herald 
Tribune, The Sun, The Sydney Morning, The Australian Financial Review, The Daily 
Telegraph, The Irish Times, and presses including Reuters News, Dow Jones International 
News, and Agence France Presse. Duplicates of media articles were removed so as not to 
distort the sample dataset. Covering the period from July 2011 to December 2012, the final 
data set contained 787 documents, 666 of which specifically related to foreign bribery, whilst 
the other 121 related to other general forms of bribery and corruption issues such as tax 
avoidance or money laundering. To recall, due to forceful coercive pressures,  we looked at 
post-introduction of the UK Bribery Act, as opposed to both before and after, as it is expected 
decoupling will bebe less extensive after the introduction of the UK Bribery Act. 
In an attempt compare of disclosures between companies operating in high bribe risk region 
and low risk region, this study uses TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which 
determines which countries are classified as high bribe risk and those that are not (TI, 2012). 
Many studies across a range of disciplines have used TI’s CPI in order to measure a country’s 
level of corruption and as a measure of corruption in examining associations or relationships 
with other variables (Shu Li & Triandis, 2006; Samanta & Sanyal, 2010; Smith et al., 2013). 
TI’s CPI scores countries on a scale of 0 to 100, in which 0 indicates ‘very high corruption’ 
and 100 indicates ‘very clean’ of corruption. A score below 50 is indicative of a high-risk 
bribery country (TI, 2012).  
 
5. Results 
This section shows whether and how UK-based corporations’ disclosures on curbing foreign 
bribery have changed from 2009 to 2012 in response to the introduction of the UK Bribery 
Act 2010; and whether such disclosure changes are substantively reflective of real allegations 
and incidents of foreign bribery.  
 
5.1 Change in Disclosure: Pre- and Post-implementation of the UK Bribery Act 2010 
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare the average disclosure score for 
companies before enforcement of the UK Bribery Act (2009 and 2010) (n = 99 for annual 
reports; n = 91 for CSR reports) to the average disclosure score by companies after the 
enforcement of the UK Bribery Act (2011 and 2012). As shown in Table 2, all categories 
observed a significant (p=.000) change of disclosures from before to after enactment of the 
Bribery Act. On  further examination, this change of disclosures is represented by a 
significant increase in the disclosure score between the two periods. The ‘Measures’ [annual 
reports (t = -4.288; p =.000); CSR reports (t = -7.687; p=.000)] and ‘Monitor’ [annual reports 
(t = -6.503; p = .000); CSR reports (t = -9.224; p = .000)] categories observed the highest 
mean difference. The variations among disclosures of corporations operating in different 
industries and high bribery risk countries are provided next.   
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Table 2: Results of t-tests of mean disclosure scores 
  
Mean Std. Dev. Mean t-Stat. Sig. 
  Before After Before After Difference  
    Annual Reports 
Managerial (Max = 3)  .5707  1.707  1.013  1.281 -1.136 -6.928 .000 
Human Resources 
(Max = 7) 
 .798  2.430  1.163  1.911 -1.631 -7.296 .000 
Risk (Max = 4)  1.712  3.056  .881  .945 -1.343 -10.349 .000 
Measures (Max = 29)  6.313  9.621  4.742  6.036 -3.308 -4.288 .000 
Monitor (Max = 20)  6.505  9.656  2.854 3.327  -3.414 -6.503 .000 
  CSR Reports 
Managerial  1.373 2.478 1.182 .925  -1.104 -7.019 .000 
Human Resources 1.110 2.923 1.164 1.498 -1.813 -9.118 .000 
Risk Assessment 1.203 2.517 .934 1.170  -1.313 -8.368 .000 
Measures  6.791 12.714  4.946  5.437  -5.923 -7.687 .000 
Monitor  4.318 8.439 2.607  3.570  -4.27 -9.224 .000 
 
5.1.2 Industry Variation of Disclosure of Measures to Curb Foreign Bribery 
Table 3 shows the variation of disclosures among six different industries: Mining, Utilities 
and Construction; General Retailers; Telecommunications and Equipment; Pharmaceutical 
and Medical Care; Financials; and Others
6
. The results for annual report disclosures are 
shown in Table 3. The results for CSR reports are shown in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
6 The ‘Others’ industry category is comprised of Aerospace & Defence, General Industrials, Media and Travel 
& Leisure industries. 
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Table 3: Industry Variation of Disclosures in Annual Reports Relating to Curbing Foreign 
Bribery 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Industry Variation of Disclosures in CSR Reports Relating to Curbing Foreign Bribery 
Average 
number  of 
disclosures 
Mining, Utilities 
and 
Construction 
General 
Retailers 
Tele-communications & 
Equipment 
Pharmaceuti
cal & 
Medical Care 
Financials Others Kruskal-Wallis 
Test 
(P value) 
N 25 20 12 9 21 12  
 Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
Mean  
(Std Dev) 
Managerial 
0.84 
(1.10) 
1.7 
(1.31) 
0.38 
(0.87) 
1.88 
(1.16) 
 
0.58 
(1.16) 
1.71 
(1.36) 
 
0.33 
(1.00) 
1.56 
(1.31) 
 
0.68 
(1.03) 
1.89 
(1.28) 
0.36 
(0.93) 
1.32 
(1.4
4) 
 
.355 
 
.757 
Mean  
(Std Dev) 
Human 
Resources 
1.06 
(1.30) 
2.64 
(1.96) 
0.98 
(1.30) 
2.50 
(2.01) 
0.54 
(1.03) 
2.38 
(2.02) 
 
0.33 
(0.71) 
2.06 
(1.98) 
0.74 
(1.19) 
2.50 
(1.94) 
0.68 
(0.99) 
2.14 
(1.67) 
 
.407 .845 
Mean  
(Std Dev) 
Risk 
1.64 
(1.03) 
2.94 
(1.01) 
 
1.60 
(0.90) 
2.93 
(1.02) 
1.79 
(0.66) 
3.13 
(1.05) 
 
1.94 
(0.85) 
3.11 
(0.86) 
1.82 
(0.85) 
3.18 
(0.73) 
1.64 
(0.91) 
3.18 
(1.05) 
.885 .932 
Mean  
(Std Dev) 
Measures 
6.98 
(5.66) 
10.72 
(6.56) 
6.45 
(4.02) 
9.18 
(4.37) 
4.42 
(4.40) 
7.79 
(7.29) 
5.44 
(4.84) 
8.67 
(7.32) 
7.11 
(5.22) 
10.13 
(6.11) 
6.04 
(3.54) 
9.79 
(5.54) 
.366 .482 
Mean  
(Std Dev) 
Monitoring 
7.42 
(3.51) 
10.72 
(4.04) 
6.05 
(2.57) 
9.98 
(3.67) 
 
6.04 
(3.14) 
8.46 
(4.16) 
 
8.22 
(4.29) 
11.83 
(5.72) 
 
7.79 
(3.3) 
11.32 
(3.15) 
5.93 
(3.26) 
9.39 
(4.04) 
.318 .204 
Mean  
(Std Dev) 
Total 
17.94 
(10.0) 
28.72 
(12.6) 
15.45 
(6.84) 
26.45 
(9.69) 
13.38 
(7.98) 
23.46 
(12.94) 
16.28 
(8.86) 
27.22 
(15.08) 
18.13 
(8.22) 
29.03 
(9.99) 
14.64 
(5.87) 
25.82 
(10.9) 
.471 .461 
  Average 
number  of 
disclosures 
Mining, Utilities and 
Construction 
General 
Retailers 
Tele-
communications 
& Equipment 
Pharmaceutica
l & Medical 
Care 
Financials Others Kruskal-Wallis 
Test 
(P value) 
N 25 20 12 9 21 12  
 Before after Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After 
   Mean  
   (Std Dev)           
Managerial 
1.41 
(1.12) 
2.28 
(1.16) 
1.19 
(1.27) 
2.31 
(0.91) 
 
1.50 
(1.36) 
2.32 
(1.23) 
 
1.89 
(1.05) 
2.78 
(0.44) 
 
1.32 
(1.22) 
2.76 
(0.48) 
1.14 
(1.12) 
2.59 
(0.92) 
 
.733 .405 
     Mean  
   (Std Dev)     
Human   
Resources 
1.59 
(1.28) 
3.02 
(1.70) 
0.78 
(0.93) 
2.28 
(0.96) 
 
 
0.64 
(1.00) 
1.64 
(1.43) 
1.44 
(1.18) 
3.61 
(1.24) 
0.84 
(1.05) 
3.42 
(1.43) 
 
1.32 
(1.33) 
3.64 
(1.12) 
 
.123 .002 
     Mean  
(Std Dev)  
Risk 
1.20 
(1.03) 
2.52 
(1.22) 
0.97 
(0.76) 
2.42 
(1.02) 
 
1.23 
(0.98) 
2.23 
(1.54) 
1.78 
(0.97) 
2.89 
(1.22) 
1.13 
(0.97) 
2.53 
(1.09) 
1.23 
(0.85) 
2.64 
(1.16) 
 
.440 .813 
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A non-parametric test, the Kruskal-Wallis test, was run to understand whether there is 
significant industry variation of disclosures on curbing foreign bribery. Results in Table 3 
show that, for the annual report disclosures, there were no significant variations among 
industries (Managerial p =.757; Human Resources p=.845; Risk p=.932; Measures p=.482; 
Monitor p=.204 and Total p=.461). Whilst it is acknowledged that Table 4 observed 
significant variation among industries (p=.002) for the ‘Human Resources’ category of 
disclosures in CSR reports, it is the overall observation from the other four categories 
(Managerial p=.405; Risk p=.813; Measures p=.056; Monitor p=.295 and Total p=.366) that 
industry variation was non-significant.  
One might expect that belonging to a specific industry would impact organisations’ level of 
disclosure. For example, some industries such as Mining, Utilities and Construction and 
Telecommunications and Equipment, are perceived as more bribe risky due to the exposure to  
foreign bribery related activity organisations may face in their operations (TI, 2011). And it is 
assumed that, the higher risk an organisation faces due to industry membership, the higher 
variation in disclosure (Cho & Patten, 2007 on environmental disclosures). Our result  was 
not consistent  with prior research as we found  non-significant variation  for disclosure 
scores before and after the introduction of the UK Bribery Act. Since almost all observation 
resulted with non-significant industry variation in disclosures, the results were consistent with 
the theoretical notion of isomorphism processes pressuring one unit in a population to behave 
in the same way as another unit in that same population, due to the same set of environmental 
conditions. The UK Bribery Act is an environmental ‘condition’ that sets the same standard 
for all organisations, across all industries. Regulation exerted this pressure across all 
industries because the UK Bribery Act was not industry specific. Therefore, no variation in 
disclosure means that organisations are behaving in the same way, consistent with the notion 
of institutional isomorphism.   
 
5.1.3 The Association of Disclosures with the Number of High-Risk Bribery Countries 
A potential confounding factor relevant to this study is that, industry aside, companies 
operating in high-risk bribery regions such as developing nations are assumed to be more 
exposed to public scrutiny when engaging in cross-border transactions. Accordingly, 
companies operating in high-risk bribery regions have incentives for disclosure beyond what 
is required. However, due to this investigation being a study dedicated to looking at the top 
100 listed companies on the London Stock Exchange, it was expected that a majority if not 
    Mean  
   (Std Dev) 
Measures 
7.00 
(4.53) 
13.46 
(5.14) 
6.69 
(5.03) 
11.53 
(5.37) 
6.09 
(6.01) 
9.86 
(6.83) 
10.17 
(6.02) 
16.44 
(6.57) 
6.55 
(4.40) 
13.26 
(4.33) 
4.86 
(4.12) 
11.95 
(4.18) 
.406 .056 
Mean  
(Std Dev) 
Monitoring 
4.83 
(2.77) 
8.50 
(2.77) 
4.44 
(2.44) 
9.19 
(3.38) 
3.82 
(3.64) 
7.05 
(5.89) 
 
4.33 
(2.86) 
8.56 
(2.70) 
4.71 
(2.30) 
9.84 
(3.32) 
3.14 
(1.45) 
7.50 
(2.25) 
.405 .295 
Mean  
(Std Dev)  
Total 
16.02 
(9.05) 
29.78 
(9.95) 
14.08 
(7.84) 
27.72 
(9.34) 
13.27 
(11.60) 
23.09 
(15.29) 
19.61 
(8.05) 
34.28 
(9.84) 
14.55 
(7.33) 
31.82 
(8.36) 
11.68 
(7.95) 
28.32 
(7.87) 
.489 .366 
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all the sample companies would  multinational operating in high bribery risk regions
7
. Table 
5 provides an overview of corporations in higher risk bribery regions.  
Table 5: Number of High-Risk Bribery Countries in which Companies Operate, by Industry 
 
With the exception of a few companies across all industries, all sample companies have 
operations in high-risk bribery countries. Table 5 shows the Pharmaceutical & Medical Care 
Industry as operating in the highest average number of high bribery-risk countries. 
Considering that the number of companies within the Pharmaceutical and Medical Care 
industry is the smallest (n=9), yet still operates, on average, in the highest number of high 
risk bribery countries, suggests that the Pharmaceutical & Medical Care industry faces a 
wider exposure than other industries such as Mining, Utilities and Construction (n=25; 
average number of countries= 15), General Retailers (n=20; average number of 
countries=29), and Financials (n=11; average number of countries=22). Despite these 
differences in numbers, it is still evident that all companies across all industries are operating 
in about 10 to 30 high risk bribery countries and thus face a high level exposure to threats of 
bribing foreign public officials. This study delves further into this relationship by determining 
whether the actual number (i.e., higher number of countries equals higher exposure) of high-
risk bribery countries a company operates in, is correlated with a company’s disclosure 
practice.  
As shown in Table 6, before regulation, some disclosure categories such as ‘Human 
Resources’ ‘Managerial’ and ‘Risk’ results show a positive and significant correlation 
between disclosure and number of high risk countries. For annual reports, disclosures under 
the ‘Human Resources’ category (2009 r=.213, p=.034; 2010 r=.239, p=.017) and for CSR 
reports, disclosures under ‘Managerial’ category (r = .251, p=.017 for 2009 and r=.211 and 
p=.044 for 2010) were significantly correlated with companies’ operations in the number of 
high-risk countries.   
Before regulation, the only consistent result found across both channels of corporate 
reporting was the corporate disclosures scores under the ‘Risk’ category. These disclosures 
were positively and significantly correlated with the number of high risk bribery countries 
companies operate in (annual reports r=.290, p=.004 for 2009 r=.293 p=.003 for 2010; CSR 
reports r=.301, p=.004 for 2009; r=.287, p=.006 for 2010; r=.207, p=.049).  Interestingly, the 
                                                            
7 When we refer to operation, it covers companies’ operation in both home and host nations (being subsidiaries).  
  Mining, 
Utilities and 
Construction 
General 
Retailers 
Tele-
communications 
& Equipment 
Pharmaceutical & 
Medical Care 
Financials Others Total 
N 25 20 12 9 21 12 99 
Number of 
companies that 
operate in high risk 
bribery countries 
 
24 
 
18 
 
11 
 
9 
 
19 
 
11 
 
92 
Average number of 
high risk bribery 
countries in which 
companies operate 
15 29 24 32 12 22 134 
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significant observations were all during 2009 and 2010, with the exception of ‘Risk’ 
disclosures in CSR reports for 2011 (even though p=.049 is pushing at the boundaries of 
statistical significance). Therefore, before introduction of the UK Bribery Act, there was a 
statistically significant association between the number of high risk bribery countries 
companies operate in and the number of disclosures on curbing foreign bribery companies 
make in relation to ‘Human Resources’, ‘Risk’, and ‘Managerial’ disclosure. This may be due 
to corporations emphasising some points of disclosure more than others, due to the perceived 
exposure risk pertinent to operating in a high-risk bribery region. For example, corporations 
operating in a large number of high risk bribery countries may have a stronger focus on 
disclosing information about the potential risks their employees face operating in such 
countries and, respectively, management’s commitment to combating foreign bribery risks.  
 
Table 6: Association between Disclosures and the Number of High-Risk Bribery Regions with 
Companies’ Operations 
  
Number of Countries 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 
  r P value r P value r P value r P value 
 Annual Reports 
Managerial .11 0.277 .07 0.49 0.031 0.761 0.093 0.361 
Human 
Resources 
.213* .034 .239* 0.017 0.106 0.297 0.129 0.202 
Risk .290** .004 .293** 0.003 0.104 0.307 0.112 0.269 
Measures -0.046 .652 -.06 0.557 -0.05 0.571 -0.05 0.58 
Monitor .19 .059 .187 0.064 0.142 0.162 0.027 0.791 
 
 
CSR Reports 
 
Managerial .251* .017 .211* .044 .133 .201 .116 .273 
 
Human 
Resources 
.145 .169 .142 .179 .063 .552 .083 .431 
 
Risk .301** .004 .287** .006 .207* .049 .163 .122 
 
Measures .056 .596 .056 .601 .105 .321 .024 .818 
 
Monitor .100 .345 .090 .396 .061 .565 -.015 .887 
 
*p<.01; **p<.001  
 
Notably, for 2011 and 2012, coinciding with the introduction of the UK Bribery Act, all but 
one observation was found non-significant. This indicates that, no association between the 
number of high-risk bribery countries a company operates in and a company’s disclosures on 
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curbing foreign bribery, is evident in the results from 2011 and 2012. It is suggested that the 
UK Bribery Act created a strong pressure for companies to make disclosures of foreign 
bribery practices and measures to curb foreign bribery in regards to all disclosure categories. 
With this legislation demanding higher transparency for all companies subject to the Act , 
and not just those that are more exposed to bribery risks due to their geographical presence, 
provides results consistent with the notion of isomorphic coercive pressures – forcing units in 
a population to behave similarly due to similar environmental conditions.  
 
5.2 Comparison of Media’s Allegations of Foreign Bribery Incidents with Corporations’ 
Disclosures on Curbing Foreign Bribery 
News media articles were examined and compared to corporations’ disclosures in order to 
determine whether corporations’ disclosures were substantively reflective of real incidents of 
foreign bribery.  
 
Table 7: Foreign Bribery Related Incidents in News Media and Related Corporate Foreign 
Bribery Disclosures 
 
According to Table 7, media attention towards allegations, prosecutions or settlements of 
corporate bribery of foreign public officials by UK corporations is dominated by Mining, 
Telecommunications and ‘Other’ industries. The number of articles dedicated to foreign 
bribery related incidents, released after the implementation of the UK Bribery Act was 239 
 Media Attention of Foreign Bribery 
related Allegations 
Foreign Bribery Disclosure Response of Alleged Companies 
Industry Number 
of 
Articles 
Number of 
Companies 
Alleged of 
Foreign 
Bribery 
Number of 
Incidents or 
Foreign 
Bribery 
Allegations 
Number of 
Companies 
that made 
Disclosure  
Number of 
companies 
that did not 
make 
Disclosure 
Number of 
Incidents 
Disclosed by 
Companies 
Number of 
Incidents 
not 
Disclosed 
by 
Companies 
Mining, Utilities and 
Construction 
239 6 7 3 3 3 4 
General Retailers 23 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Tele-communications 
& Equipment 
  159 3 3 2 1 2 1 
Pharmaceutical & 
Medical Care 66 2 4 2 0 2 0 
Financials 45 2 5 0 2 0 3 
Other 134 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Total 666 17 19 9 8 9 10 
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for the Mining, Utilities and Construction industries; 159 for the Telecommunications and 
Equipment industry; and 134 for the ‘Other’ classified industry. The Mining industry had 
indeed deserved the most media attention due to it having recorded the most number of 
separate incidents (seven incidents for six companies). The number of separate foreign-
bribery incidents per industry was higher for the Pharmaceutical & Medical Care industry 
(four incidents for two companies); and for the Financials industry (five incidents for two 
companies). Table 7 reveals that, for the two pharmaceutical companies, both made 
disclosures for the two incidents that had been documented, whilst companies under the 
Financials industry made no disclosures in relation to reported incidents. Within the three 
industries generating the most media attention, the Mining industry indicated three out of six 
alleged companies made disclosures; Telecommunications documented one out of three 
alleged companies made disclosures, and the ‘Others’ industry documented one out of two 
alleged companies made disclosures. Whether such disclosures were reflective of real life 
allegations and incidents of foreign bribery, reported by the news media , is of significant 
interest. Such information will help address whether and to what degree decoupling may be 
observed. 
Comparing news media articles on foreign bribery with corporate disclosures on curbing 
foreign bribery is consistent with other studies that analyse news media articles in order to 
determine corporations’ behaviour (Hartz & Steger, 2010). Examples of foreign bribery 
related incidents and the corresponding corporate disclosures (or lack thereof) are provided 
next in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Summary of Bribery Related Incidents in News Media and Corresponding 
Annual Report Disclosures 
Company  Incident and Key Allegations Reporting within the concern company  annual  
reports 
AstraZeneca 
PLC 
Criminally indicted by Serbian authorities as part 
of a wider investigation into allegations of bribery. 
October 2011. The Financial Times. 
In 2011 Annual report, AstraZeneca disclosed 
details of the criminal indictment. Disclosure was 
detailed with the parties involved in the incident and 
the current status of the indictment. 
 
BAE 
Systems  
 
The company failed to keep adequate accounting 
records related to materially substantial 
commission payments made to overseas agents in 
assisting the company to obtain contracts from the 
Tanzanian government to buy a radar system. 
January 2011. The Financial Times 
  
 
BAE Systems did not acknowledge the settlement 
agreement in 2011 or 2012 annual reports. 
Barclays a. Investigated for providing $40million loan to 
Tanzania to buy a radar system – the same radar 
system under investigation of BAE Systems. There 
are questions of what due diligence Barclays did on 
the loan to Tanzania to be reassured that the 
funding would not facilitate a corrupt deal. July 
2011, The Financial Times 
 
b. Scrutinised for providing “multi-million euro 
loan to Lebanese arms dealer, and politically 
exposed, Ziad Takieddine” The loan 
recommendation suggested that Takieddine would 
act as a business partner to Barclays by helping the 
a. Barclays did not disclose any information 
relating to this incident in 2011 or 2012 annual 
reports.  
 
 
 
 
 
b. No disclosures made on this incident in 2012 
Annual Report 
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bank further its activities with Libyan foreign 
public officials. July 2012, Media Part 
 
BG Group 
 
One of BG Group’s joint ventures in Aksai, 
Kazakhstan, Karachaganak Petroleum Operating 
BV, went under investigation into allegations of 
bribery after Detsche Post AG, a freight shipment 
handler, received an anonymous email alleging 
improper facilitation payments for moving goods 
through Aksai’s customs office and bribe payments 
to Kazakh custom officials. June 2012, The Wall 
Street Journal  
 
No disclosures on this incident  within the BG 
annual report (2011, 2012) 
BHP Billiton a. Alleged of making a $US1 million payment to 
Cambodian government in 2006 to secure bauxite 
leases. June 2011, The Sydney Morning, The 
Financial Times. 
 
 
 
 
b. BHP Billiton is under investigation by the 
Australian Federal Police over its sponsorship of 
the 2008 Beijing Olympics as part of an ongoing 
U.S. Department of Justice investigation into 
possible violations of anti-corruption laws. The 
investigation is related to alleged hospitality or 
gifts to foreign officials, including Chinese 
dignitaries. March 2013, The Australian Financial 
Review, The Wall Street Journal 
 
a. In Annual report 2012, BHP disclosed 
information that it is continuing an internal 
investigation into allegations of “possible 
misconduct involving interactions with 
government officials” However no details were 
disclosed on which and why government officials 
were involved. 
 
b. No disclosure on Beijing Olympic incident 
within the BHP annual reports (Annual reports, 
2011, 2012 or website) 
BP  BP conducted an internal investigation into 
allegations of bribery at its tanker chartering 
division. The allegations focus on the relationship 
between a senior BP employee and one of the 
company’s suppliers. March 2012, Dow Jones 
International, The Daily Telegraph 
b. BP under investigation with UK Serious Fraud 
Office over bribery allegations relating to 
engineering projects one of its contractors is 
undertaking in West Asia, June 2012, Dow Jones 
International, The Daily Telegraph 
 No disclosures were made in BP annual reports 
of 2010, 2011, 2012 in relation to both incidents. 
 
Diageo 
 
Diageo employees or contractors paid bribes to 
government officials in South Korea, India and 
Thailand to boost sales and receive favourable tax 
treatment. June 2011, The Financial Times 
 
Disclosure made in 2011 and 2012 annual report. 
Monetary settlement amount was disclosed but 
details of the incident were generic and not 
specific to the incident.  
 
HSBC 
Holdings 
 
Accused of funnelling £14m in alleged bribes paid 
by a British defence firm to a Saudi Arabian royal 
officials. October 2012, The Sunday Times 
 
No disclosure made in 2011 and 2012 annual 
reports. 
 
International 
Business  
Machines 
Corp (IBM) 
 
IBM settled with regulators over allegations it 
bribed Chinese and South Korean officials to win 
at least $54 million in government contracts. June 
2011, National Post, New York Business Journal 
 
In annual report 2011, there was disclosure of the 
settlement but it was not specific to foreign 
bribery related activities.  
 
 
Nippon 
Telephone & 
Telegraph  
(NTT) 
 
Police arrested the company's president on 
suspicion of bribing the NTT East employee in 
order to secure a contract from NTT East. 
November 2011, Kyodo News 
 
No disclosure was made in 2011 and 2012 annual 
reports. 
 
Rolls Royce  
 
Rolls Royce faced allegations of bribery and 
corruption in making payments in return for a 2005 
contract with Air China and a deal with China 
Eastern Airlines in 2010. February 2012, The 
Sunday Times 
 
Detailed disclosure was given in financial notes to 
contingent liability section of annual report 2012. 
However disclosure was not specific to incident 
only that the company identified “matters of 
concern in these [Indonesia and China] and in 
other overseas markets.  
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Royal Dutch 
Shell PLC 
 
Settled allegations that they or their contractors 
bribed foreign officials to smooth the way for 
importing equipment and materials into several 
countries.  July 2012, Dow Jones News Service 
 
Generic disclosure was given and was not specific 
to foreign bribery: “Shell subsidiary agreed to a 
Deferred Prosecution Agreement…which arose in 
connection with its use of the freight-forwarding 
firm Panalpin in Nigeria.” Annual report 2012 
 
Sainsbury 
PLC 
 
A company executive received corrupt payments 
totalling £4.9million from directors of a major 
potato supplier in return for granting them a 
lucrative contract. July 2012, Telegraph Online 
 
Incident remained undisclosed in 2011 and 2012 
annual and CSR reports.  
 
Siemens AG 
 
Siemens managers are alleged to have made 
payments to high-ranking individuals in the Gulf 
state's Energy and Water Ministry. The company 
received several contracts during 2010 from the 
Kuwaiti government. April 2012, The Financial 
Times 
 
Disclosure was provided in annual report 2011 
and mentioned it involved a project in Kuwait, but 
did not mention it involved foreign bribery related 
payments.  
 
Smith & 
Nephew 
Smith & Nephew distributors paid bribes on behalf 
of the company's subsidiaries to Greece doctors in 
order to purchase Smith & Nephew's products, yet 
it appeared as though Smith & Nephew units were 
paying for marketing services, though no services 
were actually performed. December 2012. Dow 
Jones News Service 
Disclosure in 2012 annual report was informative 
yet lacked substantiveness in relation to the Greek 
distributor scheme. The company’s disclosure 
instead focused on claims of commitment to 
enhanced compliance programmes.  
 
Total S.A. 
 
Total allegedly paid Iranian public officers $60m 
and was given contracts to develop three separate 
oil and gas fields in return. September 2012, The 
Financial Times 
 
Disclosure was present, yet extremely generic and 
did not make reference to any oil and gas 
contracts: “employees were placed under formal 
criminal investigation for possible charges as 
accessories to the corruption of foreign public 
agents” Annual report 2012 
 
 
Tullow Oil 
Tullow Oil denied allegations made in the Ugandan 
Parliament that it paid bribes to senior government 
ministers. June 2012, The Irish Times.   
No disclosure was made in relation to the 
allegations in 2011 and 2012 annual reports.  
 
Results in Table 8 show that some incidents were not disclosed by companies at all. Some 
were disclosed but in a generic and nonspecific way, whilst others were disclosed with close 
attention to the details that match information provided by news media
8
. Closer examination 
of these companies is provided next.  
 
5.2.1 Corporations’ Response to Allegations and Incidents of Foreign Bribery: Degree of 
Decoupling 
This study now shows the substantiveness of companies’ disclosure by applying the three 
levels of decoupling introduced in section 3 - malignant separation, symbolic adoption and 
complete implementation. As shown in Table 9, out of the companies alleged with foreign 
bribery (n=17 refer to Table 7), 47 per cent (n=8) did not disclose the incident, 35 per cent 
(n=6) disclosed generic information in relation to the incident, and 17 per cent (n=3) fully 
disclosed detailed information in relation to the incident. Reporting occurred for both the year 
that incident was reported and for the following year so media and reporting time lags were 
                                                            
8 It is important to note here that in order to control time gap issues from when the incident occurred, to when 
the news article was published, to when corporations’ were required to make publish their corporate reports this 
study looks at allegations and incidents from only after the UK Bribery Act. This ensures that cases arising from 
data collection are in the appropriate timeframe to be under the influence of the UK Bribery Act. 
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controlled. This indicates that considerably more companies are fully decoupling their 
disclosures from real events, as opposed to fully adopting regulators’ call for higher 
transparency.  
To apply these levels of decoupling to corporations’ disclosure, we further examined the 
allegations and disclosures of the companies that met the standards of (1) receiving the most 
media attention, (2) operating in the highest number of bribery risk countries and (3) the 
nature of the incident and company’s impact on society.  
 
Table 9: Companies Classified in Three Degrees of Decoupling: strategy, nature and companies 
Degree of 
Decoupling 
Decoupling Strategy Nature of Disclosure Companies 
Full Decoupling Malignant Separation Non-disclosure, separation BAE Systems 
Barclays (Both incidents)  
BG Group 
BHP (Second incident)  
BP (Both incidents)  
NTT 
Sainsbury PLC 
Tullow Oil 
 
Slight Decoupling Symbolic Adoption Ceremonial, Ritualistic, 
Generic. Present but not 
substantial 
BHP Billiton (First incident)  
IBM 
Rolls Royce 
Royal Dutch Shell 
Siemens AG 
Smith & Nephew 
No Decoupling Complete 
Implementation 
Substantive, Detailed.  Full 
Disclosure 
AstraZeneca PLC 
Diageo 
Total S.A. 
 
Smith & Nephew PLC 
In February 2012, London-based medical company Smith & Nephew PLC agreed to pay a 
US$18 million fine and $5.4 million settlement charge over the allegation that a former 
distributor bribed public doctors in Greece. News reports (over 100 news articles gathered), 
reveal that Smith & Nephew subsidiaries sold orthopedic products to doctors in Greece 
through a Greek distributor, whose funds were housed by the development of three shell 
entities in the UK, ultimately controlled by the distributor. The scheme created offshore funds 
and used them to pay bribes on behalf of the company to the doctors to purchase Smith & 
Nephew’s products (Tadena, 2012). The company’s accounts made it appear as though the 
subsidiaries were paying for marketing services, even though no services were performed. In 
light of the settlement charge, authorities also reported that the company agreed to maintain 
an ‘enhanced compliance program’ and appoint an independent monitor for at least 18 
months to review and report on this program (Tadena, 2012). The settlement came as 
authorities focussed on criminalising the bribery of foreign officials in the light of the UK 
Bribery Act 2010. In its disclosure response, Smith & Nephew stated in 2012 annual report: 
“On 6 February 2012, Smith & Nephew announced that it had reached settlement with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) in connection with this matter [sale of 
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products in certain countries outside of the U.S.]. Smith & Nephew has paid slightly less than $23m in 
fines and profit disgorgement and committed to maintain an enhanced compliance programme and 
appoint an independent monitor for at least 18 months to review and report on its compliance programme 
to both the SEC and DOJ. The settlement agreements impose detailed reporting, compliance and other 
requirements on Smith & Nephew for a three-year term. Failure to comply with these requirements, or 
any other violation of law, could have severe consequences for the Group.” (Annual Report 2012, p. 53). 
This statement reveals that the company had reached a settlement agreement after conducting 
an informal investigation in connection with the sale of products in certain countries. Whilst 
it makes some useful information publicly available, it fails to provide explicit or implicit 
information that the sale of products was done through bribery. There are key pieces of 
missing information here; that is, who specifically sold the products, to whom were the 
products sold, and most importantly, how the products were sold and if they benefited the 
Greek doctors, noting that in the Greek healthcare system, doctors are classified as 
government officials. The non-specificity of Smith & Nephew’s disclosure is consistent with 
a symbolic strategy, where the extent of decoupling between action and practice was slight, 
as witnessed by the missing information in the company’s passive and generic nature of 
disclosure. In comparison to the next company examined, AstraZeneca, Smith & Nephew’s 
disclosure of foreign bribery related allegations and settlements are not as detailed. With 
AstraZeneca PLC, we observed different disclosure and decoupling strategies.  
AstraZeneca PLC 
AstraZeneca is a large multinational pharmaceutical and biologics company headquartered in 
London (AstraZeneca annual report, 2012). AstraZeneca sells its medicinal products to 
patients worldwide and is therefore very much exposed to the risks of foreign bribery when 
advertising their products to doctors and hospitals all over the world. AstraZeneca also 
operates in the Pharmaceuticals industry, which was identified in Table 7 to be operating, on 
average, in the highest number of high-bribery risk countries. As noted in Table 8, Serbian 
authorities served AstraZeneca with a criminal indictment in August 2011. The indictment 
was reported when UK authorities intensified their commitment to scrutinising alleged 
bribery beyond UK borders (Jack, MacDonald & Crabtree, 2011). The company’s disclosure 
related to this incident is below:  
“In August 2011, AstraZeneca UK Limited’s Representative Office in Belgrade, Serbia was 
served with a criminal indictment alleging that local employees of AstraZeneca and several 
other pharmaceutical companies who are also named defendants in the indictment, made 
allegedly improper payments to physicians at the Institute of Oncology and Radiology of 
Serbia. The investigation aims to verify whether certain payments would have benefited 
Serbian officials in violation of the United States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 and 
the UK Bribery Act 2010. AstraZeneca filed a number of preliminary procedural objections 
asking the Serbian criminal court to dismiss the indictment against the Representative Office 
and those objections were granted in November 2011. The Serbian prosecutor then amended 
and re-served the indictment and, in December 2011, AstraZeneca asked the Court again to 
dismiss the indictment.” (AstraZeneca Annual Report, 2011, p.189) 
This disclosure was clear and concise in revealing why the company was indicted and who 
was involved in the transaction. Since AstraZeneca disclosed the incident and explained who 
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was being investigated, why they were being investigated and to whom the alleged bribery 
payment was made, it can be argued the AstraZeneca’s disclosure is consistent with the 
expectations of the UK Bribery Act. It is indicative of no or limited decoupling
9
. 
Barclays PLC 
We also looked at Barclays Bank.  It was alleged of the highest number of separate bribery 
incidents, two of which related to bribing foreign officials. Barclays is the UK’s largest 
multinational bank, providing financial services globally in more than 50 countries in Europe, 
North and South America, Africa and Asia (Barclays, 2013). It is evident that Barclays has 
made its worldwide stamp as a major player in the financial industry. Barclays’ self-
proclamation of being a “community supporter” is manifested in its various sponsorships of 
large global events such as the 2012 London Olympics and the 2014 Brazil World Cup 
(Barclays, 2013). It is because of this that it is expected that such a large MNC, operating in 
high risk bribery regions on a daily basis, should be all the more adamant about adhering to 
the call of higher transparency and accountability brought to light by the UK Bribery Act. 
Table 8 shows that Barclays has been in the media spotlight regarding three different 
incidents of foreign bribery since 2011. Two of these incidents were not disclosed in annual 
or CSR reports. As shown in Table 9, in 2011, Barclays was investigated for providing a $40 
million loan to Tanzania to buy a radar system amid the international bribery probe into BAE 
Systems (Binham, 2011). Following BAE Systems’ settlement with the UK Serious Fraud 
Office (SFO), Global Witness demand investigation of the funding Barclays provided to 
Tanzania. This call resulted from concern about the due diligence Barclays exercised on this 
loan to ensure that the money would not be used to facilitate corruption (Binham, 2011). 
As shown in Table 8, in 2012 Barclays was scrutinised for agreeing to a multi-million euro 
loan to Lebanese arms dealer, Ziad Takieddine, even though he was under a major French 
political corruption investigation. The loan recommendation suggested that Takieddine would 
act as a business partner to Barclays by helping the bank further its activities with public 
officials in Libya (Arfi & Laske, 2012). It was also reported that the loan would expose the 
bank to an advantage in significant business development opportunities in Libya. 
Investigations of foreign bribery rightfully went underway due to the notion that Barclays 
may have used this loan as a ‘bribe’ to gain a business advantage in Libya (Arfi & Laske, 
2012). Despite the seriousness of these allegations, both incidents remained undisclosed by 
Barclays in their annual or CSR reports. Non-disclosure is consistent with the notion of that 
malignant separation between the incident (real event) and the corporation’s practice 
(disclosures)
10
. Such misalignment might be due to waiting for UK authorities to file 
litigation against the company.  
 
                                                            
9 Although such disclosure is consistent with no decoupling strategy , we acknowledge that the company’s 
nature of disclosure also depends on notion of pragmatic legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) which suggests that if a 
certain bad news is likely to impact market or shareholder return,  the company won’t disclose that information. 
10 Potential litigation risk and negative market reaction might be  a reason behind  the malignant strategy.  This 
deserves further research attention. 
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6. Discussion 
This study began with an important question: Whether and how corporations subject to the 
UK Bribery Act have changed their disclosures, from 2009 to 2012, on curbing foreign 
bribery in response to the 2011 enactment of this  Act. We observed disclosure change in the 
form of a significant increase in disclosure participation and volume, consistent with  the 
DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) theory of coercive isomorphism. Whilst TI (2011) suggests that 
some industries such as Mining, Utilities and Construction and Telecommunications and 
Equipment, are perceived as more bribe risky due to the exposure of foreign bribery-related 
risk pertinent to operating in a particular industry, disclosure variation among industries is not 
evident in this study. Indeed, some existing research in voluntary environmental disclosures 
(Cho & Patten, 2007; Zeng et al., 2012) found that belonging to a specific industry impacts 
organisations’ level of disclosure; however, our results are inconsistent with Cho & Patten 
(2007) and Zeng et al., (2012). Reasons for this outcome may be that anti-bribery laws and 
initiatives were not created on the basis of being specific to particular industries (OECD 
Convention, 1998; Ministry of Justice, 2011).  We also looked at the association between the 
number of high-risk bribery countries companies operate in and their respective disclosure 
scores. For the years before the enforcement of the UK Bribery Act (2009 and 2010), results 
show significant correlations under three of the five disclosure categories (Managerial, 
Human Resources and Risk). However, after the enforcement of regulation, 2011 and 2012, 
results do not show conclusive evidence of correlation between the number of high-risk 
bribery regions and corporation’s disclosure score. This is consistent with institutional 
coercive isomorphism imposing pressure on organisations to behave in the same way 
regardless of the amount of exposure to bribe-related risk faced due to geographical presence.  
Investigation into whether such disclosures were decoupled from real life allegations of 
foreign bribery is arguably the heart of this paper and is what differentiates this study from 
others that examine corporations’ reporting behaviour in response to regulation. The detailed 
presentation of company case examples illustrates how the apparent compliance to the UK 
Bribery Act is contradicted by the mismatch of disclosures from practice. It is suggested that 
companies adopting a malignant separation decoupling strategy, where disclosure of a foreign 
bribery related incident is absent and decoupling is full (see Table 1), signals that the 
adoption of regulation to the extent that disclosures are substantially reflective of real events 
remains decoupled from organisational practices. For example, Barclays PLC did not disclose 
information relating to their corrupt indirect business activities with Libyan officials, 
suggesting the company decoupled its disclosures from reality in the ultimate form of being 
substantially non-reflective of real events. This strategy means malignant separation and 
complete absence of related disclosure. In hindsight, the UK Bribery Act still holds a 
coercive pressure over organisations, as observed by the significant increase in the number of 
companies disclosing information and their related disclosure volume. The presence of 
coercive pressure means that, at this stage, the regulation is a formal structure with incentives 
for compliance and a rational discourse justifying its adoption (Zbaracki, 1998; Sandholtz, 
2012).  
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To explore the impact of regulation, one may look at society, seeing that standard setters and 
regulators have an influential relationship with organisations (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). While 
organisations seek legitimacy by conforming to the expectations of regulators (Deegan, 2009 
p. 360), the regulation itself is either substantively or symbolically implemented (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983; Sandholtz, 2012). It is at this organisational level where the fate of 
regulation (whether it is effectively implemented or not) is determined. Thus, for regulation 
to be put into effective practice, it must overcome ‘boundaries’ within the institutional field. 
Such boundaries are between the regulators and the organisations and management within the 
organisation (Sandholtz, 2012).  
It is interesting to speculate how corporations’ disclosure response to regulation can be so 
malignantly separated from actual practice that full decoupling is observed. Jacobsson (2000) 
provides insights into how regulation can encounter problems in being effectively 
implemented in organisations.  Regulation is a form of expert knowledge represented as rules 
that are de-contextualised in space and time. It is because of this that an organisation’s own 
experts may easily construe regulation as being irrelevant or intrusive (Sandholtz, 2012). 
Decoupling is not necessarily a dysfunctional behaviour designed to mislead external 
stakeholders, but is analysed as a way of maintaining balance between different rationales. 
Organisations adopt a strategy that is non-isomorphic; that is, going against the forces of 
coercive isomorphism to ensure access to external resources (i.e., government, NGO and IGO 
approval) and to control internal use of resources (i.e., legitimacy and shareholder trust) 
(George et al., 2006). When organisations fully decouple their disclosures from action, it is 
argued that they are trying to combine external and internal resources by disclosing some 
relevant information but at the same time reconciling shareholder trust (George et al., 2006). 
This could explain why this study observed some companies’ disclosures were substantively 
reflective of foreign bribery incidents whilst others were not.  
We proposed that, at the stage of symbolic adoption, slight decoupling is observed and a 
company’s disclosure is of a ceremonial and ritual nature (Refer to Table 1). Through 
extensive analysis, this study found that disclosure of symbolic nature lacks specific details 
crucial to the real life incident, consistent with the notion of generic disclosure (Fiss & Zajac, 
2006; Holder-Webb & Cohen, 2012). This was exemplified by  Smith & Nephew, who 
disclosed information relating to foreign bribery settlements yet did not detail that its 
improper activity was bribery payments to foreign officials that benefited the foreign officials 
in return for a business advantage. 
Companies disclosing their ethical compliance programs in relation to the UK Bribery Act 
and other relevant anti-bribery laws can also often overshadow their practice of slight 
decoupling. For example, Barker, Pacini & Sinason (2012) suggest that one of the main 
reasons for companies to disclose information about having an anti-bribery compliance 
program is to mitigate penalties in the event of violation. This is because the existence of a 
compliance program is a significant mitigating factor in the prosecution and/or settlement of 
company’s bribery charges (Ministry of Justice, 2011). Therefore, slight decoupling 
strategies may not always indicate that the disclosure was just missing crucial information, 
but the generic nature of the disclosure may be misconstrued as useful and substantial due to 
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an overwhelming amount of information given on compliance programs promoting internal 
controls and accounting policies and procedures (see Smith & Nephew case in Table 8). 
For organisations to effectively implement regulation so that their corporate disclosures 
substantially reflect real events, their goals to curb foreign bribery need to be transformed 
into actionable anti-foreign bribery programs. Such transformation requires management 
commitment; board oversight; and contributions from departments such as human resources, 
risk assessment, auditors, corporate governance, and public relations (Ministry of Justice, 
2011; Wilkinson, 2010).  
Yet it appears the toughest obstacle for regulation in making a substantial impact on 
corporations’ disclosures is integrating the requirements of regulation with the norms, 
incentives and contextualised practices of those individuals participating in corporate 
reporting and disclosures (Sandholtz, 2012). This is because the regulation endowed with 
governmental authority and stakeholder interests must mesh with the true incentives of 
management. Since the requirement to disclose adequate procedures on curbing foreign 
bribery remains primarily voluntary, it is the management group that may exercise volition, 
which is how companies were considered to have substantially disclosed information, as 
exemplified in the case of AstraZeneca. 
As organisations disclosing information relating to their adequate anti-bribery measures 
remains primarily voluntarily (Ministry of Justice, 2011; Milford, 2013), this factor is of 
crucial importance in understanding the disclosure behaviour of corporations in response to 
the UK Bribery Act and in comparison with related news articles. Bertomeu & Cheynel 
(2013) suggested that, in an environment where disclosure is voluntary, firms support the 
demands of regulation because they are not subject to mandatory disclosure. Based on the 
findings from this study, we concur corporations significantly increased their disclosure 
volumes thereby supporting the Act’s call for higher transparency. However, the Act does not 
dictate a distinct set of disclosure requirements or reporting obligations for commercial 
organisations. Bertomeu & Cheynel (2013) argue that, when complete disclosure rules are 
given it not only encourages a wider adoption of the regulation in question, but also facilities 
effective and substantial adoption. It is, therefore, argued that there is a need for the UK 
Bribery Act to set out specific and clear requirements for the purposes of clarifying 
organisations’ reporting practices. This is consistent with Behnam & Maclean (2011), who 
argue that the clarity of regulation determines organisation’s ability to not participate in 
decoupling practices. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Given the status of the UK Bribery Act, as well as external stakeholder interests, in the fight 
against foreign bribery, the objectives of this study were to (1) understand whether and how 
UK-based corporations disclosures on curbing foreign bribery have changed from 2009 to 
2012 in response to the 2011 enactment of the UK Bribery Act and (2) investigate whether 
such disclosure changes are substantively reflective of real allegations, incidents or events 
relating to foreign bribery in order to determine whether corporations decouple their 
disclosures from actual practice. Results of this study in relation to the first objective show 
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that the UK Bribery Act has significantly influenced corporations’ disclosure behaviour. This 
is consistent with DiMaggio & Powell’s (1983) notion of coercive isomorphism. Based on 
extensive media content analysis, results in relation to the second objective find that in 
general, organisations’ disclosures are not substantively reflective of real allegations or 
incidents of foreign bribery. While 17 companies were reported to have been involved in 
foreign bribery incidents, eight companies adopted a malignant separation strategy, did not 
make disclosure in relation to the incident which is therefore indicative of full decoupling.  
Six  companies of the 17 companies followed through with a symbolic adoption strategy, 
made ceremonial and generic disclosures in relation to the incident which is therefore 
indicative of slight decoupling. Lastly, three out the 17 companies appeared to have adopted a 
complete implementation strategy which entailed full disclosures in relation to the incident 
and no decoupling between disclosure and practice. Since the purpose of the Act was to 
ensure corporations’ accountability and transparency in cross-border transactions it was 
expected that the number of companies decoupling their disclosures from action, would be 
less than the number of companies not decoupling their disclosures from action by making 
full disclosure of foreign bribery related incidents. The results, however, show that this was 
not the case. Reasons for this are the difficulties in effectively implementing regulation in 
organisations because regulation has to overcome and mesh with the norms and practices of 
those inside the organisation.   
The findings of this study contribute to existing knowledge in a four ways. Firstly, this study 
delineates foreign bribery as a stand-alone societal concern from broad matters of corruption 
and occupational fraud. Understanding foreign bribery and organisations’ practice in curbing 
foreign bribery is crucial for both MNCs as well as regulators. The World Bank estimated 
that countries improving their control of worldwide bribery could lead to a 400% increase in 
incomes per capita (World Bank, 2013). Secondly, the UK Bribery Act is the first of its kind. 
It is unprecedented in many of its requirements. Thus this is the first known study that 
investigates UK Bribery Act’s influence on corporations’ disclosures, accountability and 
transparency of foreign bribery. Thirdly and perhaps more interestingly, this study 
contributes to existing theoretical knowledge. Prior studies on decoupling have primarily 
argued that decoupling is less likely to arise in cases of coercive pressure (regulation) because 
such pressure leaves organisations little room for pushing the boundaries of non-isomorphic 
behaviour or non-compliance (Modell, 2001). Although decoupling is supposed only to 
marginally exist in the presence of coercive pressure, we found that decoupling appears rather 
extensive. Fourthly, implying that the UK Bribery Act is limited in ensuring decoupling 
minimisation is consistent with the views of those enforcing the law itself. For example, the 
2013 World Bribery and Compliance Forum, hosted by the UK SFO (primary prosecutors of 
the UK Bribery Act), reveal that SFO officers felt there were major issues in the way the Act 
was implemented in organisations (Milford, 2013). This study, therefore, has the potential to 
be of practical use for authoritative bodies responsible for prosecuting foreign bribery in the 
UK.  
There are some limitations to this study. Analysis of news media articles is exposed to 
subjectivity in the comparison and interpretation of the disclosures. In saying this, the 
statements and texts were analysed in such a way that facilitated effective interpretation and 
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accurate comparisons. Despite precautionary measures such as cross-checking referencing 
between news publications of facts within articles, data validity might be threatened and 
media might be biased (to any direction) due to the individual ideologies of those publishing 
it. Since news media analysis is focused on the messages, as opposed to the message 
producers (Fico et al., 2008), there is a potential limitation in the time lapses from when the 
foreign bribery incident in question took place, to when the media reported about it, to when 
the company published their corporate reports.   
The issue of foreign bribery deserves further research attention. Further research may analyse 
how the UK Bribery Act influences companies of other jurisdictions in order to gauge the 
effectiveness of the Act on a global scale. Another pathway for future research would be to 
use examination from the perspective of local professionals and communities in developing 
nations to see whether the Act influence local businesses that are prone to foreign bribery 
offers from MNCs.  
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Appendix A: Disclosure Index : Corporate Disclosures on Curbing Foreign Bribery 
 
MANAGERIAL COMMITMENT AND BOARD OVERSIGHT 
1. The company has a Code of Conduct, equivalent policy document or value statement that includes an explicit 
statement of the no-bribes policy 
2. There is a policy for the company to be consistent with all relevant anti-bribery laws in all jurisdictions in which 
the company transacts it business 
3. Reference to key individuals and departments involved in the development and implementation of the 
organisation’s foreign bribery prevention procedures 
HUMAN RESOURCES AND TRAINING 
4. Employees are required to read and annually sign that they have read and agree to the company’s anti-bribery 
programme and business conduct guidelines 
5. There are policies and procedures for continuing appropriate training of directors, managers, employees, agents 
and other intermediaries so that they clearly understand the company’s anti-bribery programme, know the 
company’s expectations and the sanctions procedures in the event of a violation 
6. There are policies and procedures to make clear through communications that no employee will suffer demotion, 
penalty, or other adverse consequences for refusing to pay bribes even if such refusal may result in the company 
losing business 
7. The company assesses training activities on the programme periodically for effectiveness for curbing bribery 
8. Number of employees being trained 
9. Number of employees terminated for bribery-related reasons 
10. Amount of expenditure on employee training in regards to anti-bribery 
RISK ASSESSMENT OF ANTI-BRIBERY PROGRAM 
11. The board or equivalent body has oversight of the risk assessment process for bribery in the organisation 
12. The risk assessment process identifies and prioritises risks from bribery (e.g. country risks, sectoral risks) 
13. Number of times risk assessment process is carried out in a year 
14. Detailed policies and procedures are developed and improved based on the risks identified in which they are 
benchmarked against universal business principles for countering bribery (E.g. reference to Transparency 
International, OECD, or UK Bribery Act 2010)    
 
MEASURES TO CURB DIFFERENT NATURE OF FOREIGN BRIBERY 
Facilitation Payments 
15. There is a procedure to record accurately in the books any facilitation payments made   
16. Training and guidance is provided to employees likely to encounter risks of facilitation payments on how to deal 
with them        
17. Senior management reviews and monitors implementation of the no-bribes policy with regards to facilitation 
payments 
18. Number of facilitation payments made 
19. Monetary amount of facilitation payments 
Gifts, Hospitality and Expenses 
20. The company prohibits the offer or receipt of gifts, hospitality or expenses whenever these could affect or be 
perceived to affect the outcome of business transactions and are not reasonable and bona fide expenditures 
21. There are procedures and controls, including thresholds and reporting procedures, to ensure that the company’s 
policies relating to gifts, hospitality and expenses are followed and conform to the anti-corruption laws of the 
countries where they are made or received 
22. Gifts, hospitality and expenses given or received are documented and reviewed by management to ensure 
compliance with the anti-bribery policies 
23. Number of gifts given 
24. Monetary amount spent on gifts, hospitality and expenses 
Political Contributions 
25. There is a procedure to record any political contributions made accurately in the books 
26. The policy and procedures reflect the particular risks of political contributions being used as a subterfuge for 
bribery 
27. The policy specifies that political contributions shall be in accordance with applicable anti-corruption law 
28. Number of political contributions made 
29. Monetary amount of political contributions 
Social and Charitable Contributions  
30. There is a written policy covering charitable contributions 
31. Contributions are subjected to procedures and controls to ensure they are not used as a subterfuge for bribery to 
gain undue advantage for the company 
32. There is a procedure for due diligence is carried out on recipient bodies that no foreign public official is associated 
with the body that will gain an advantage in the conduct of business 
33. Number of social/charitable contributions made 
34. Monetary amount of social/charitable contributions 
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Sponsorships 
35. There is a written public policy covering sponsorships 
36. There are procedures for approval and payment of sponsorships to ensure payments are in line with the normal 
purchasing procedures and associated with corrupt practices 
37. A list of sponsorships made is published publicly to ensure transparency in alignment with the organisation’s anti-
bribery programme 
38. Number of sponsorships the organisation provides 
39. Monetary amount given for sponsorships 
Agents and Other Intermediaries 
40. The company contractually requires its agents and other intermediaries to keep proper books and records available 
for inspections by the company, auditors or investigating authorities to ensure practices are aligned with the 
organisation’s anti-bribery programme 
41. It is the company’s policy that compensation paid to agents and other intermediaries is paid through bona fide 
channels and not to off-shore accounts 
Contractors and Suppliers 
42. The company has policy and procedures to make known its anti-bribery programme to contractors, subcontractors 
and suppliers 
43. The company has measures of training given to contractors and suppliers 
 
ACCOUNTING, MONITORING AND REVIEW OF FOREIGN BRIBERY 
General Monitoring 
44. External consultants used to monitor, advise and assure the organisation’s anti-bribery programme 
45. An external verification or assurance has been conducted 
46. Internal auditors are used to monitor and advise on the organisation’s anti-bribery programme 
47. Number of members in the audit committee who have oversight over ethical matters such as bribery and corruption 
48. The company provides secure and accessible channels through which employees can raise concerns and report 
violations (‘whistle blowing’) in confidence and without risk of reprisal 
 
Accurate Books and Records 
49. There is a procedure to implement accountability throughout the company and its subsidiaries to enforce internal 
controls and proper books and records in relation to transactions with foreign public officials 
50. There are procedures to maintain available for inspection accurate books and records that properly and fairly 
document all financial transactions 
51. There are procedures to ensure that there are no ‘off-the-books’ accounts, inadequately defined transactions or 
false entries 
Collective Action 
52. The company is a member of or supports an anti-bribery initiative 
53. The company takes part in local collective action to counter bribery 
Internal Controls 
54. The internal controls include financial and organisational checks and balances over the company’s accounting and 
record keeping practices and other business processes related to the anti-bribery programme 
55. There is an audit committee that provides oversight of internal controls, financial reporting processes and related 
functions including countering bribery 
56. Number of times internal controls are reviewed and asses in the year 
Dealing with Incidents 
57. There is a procedure in reporting foreign bribery-related incidents to the authorities 
58. The company publishes publicly details of public legal cases of foreign bribery involving the company 
59. Number of foreign bribery-related incidents 
60. Monetary amount the organisation is penalised for bribery related incidents 
61. Monetary amount of contingent liabilities arising from bribery related incidents 
Business Relationships Policy 
62. There is a policy to require or encourage the implementation of an anti-bribery programme equivalent or similar to 
its own in entities with which the company has significant business relationships 
Significant Investments 
63. The company monitors its significant investments periodically to check that their anti-bribery programmes are 
adequate and working 
 
 
 
Source: The above index has been developed from Transparency International’s adequate procedures 
guidance (Wilkinson, 2010) and UK’s adequate procedures guidance (Ministry of Justice, 2011) with 
adaptation.  
 
